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Introduction
Many economists have analyzed the local or global stability of the equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly with or without product differentiation.
1 Hahn (1962) proved that if the so-called Hahn conditions are satisfied in Cournot oligopoly without product differentiation (hereafter, the Cournot model), the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable under Hahn's best reply dynamics. Okuguchi (1964) extended Hahn's result using a more general adjustment system. Corchón (2001) proved that Hahn's stability result holds in a general aggregative game, which contains the Cournot model as its special case, provided that the game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions. However, Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1985) presented a counter-example to a certain assertion used in the proof of the Hahn-Okuguchi result. 2 According to Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1985) , the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is globally stable only in the Cournot model with 5 or less firms. Gaudet and Salant (1991) proved that there exists a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium under the Hahn conditions. Folmer and von Mouche (2004, Corollary 1) proved that an aggregative game possesses a unique Nash equilibrium under the generalized Hahn conditions. Their theorems, however, do not ensure that the unique Nash equilibrium is interior. In other words, some players active out of equilibrium may not be so at the unique Nash equilibrium. The previous works on the global stability of the Nash equilibrium or Cournot-Nash equilibrium do not explicitly describe the dynamics at the point where the trajectory moves out of the non-negative domain. Moreover, the adjustment processes used in the previous works do not necessarily ensure the non-negativity of all strategic variables over time independently of the initial condition. Hence, we will formulate the dynamics at the boundary and prove that if an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, a unique Nash equilibrium, which may not necessarily be interior, is globally stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with the non-negativity constraints.
Analysis
Let   i u x be player i's payoff function in a general n-person game, where
The actions of the game are strategic substitutes if
The game is aggregative if player i's payoff function
Let us assume that the partial derivatives of i h satisfy the following assumptions.
for all feasible strategies and for all i.
3 See Bulow et al. (1985) .
4 See e.g. Okuguchi (1993) and Corchón (1994 Corchón ( , 2001 ) for examples of aggregative games.
Equivalently, at the unique Nash equilibrium
R X  is a unique non-negative solution to the problem of maximization problem of 
Assumption 1 with strict inequality and Assumption 2 are introduced in Corchón (1994). 6 As for the Cournot model, Gaudet and Salant (1991) prove that there exists a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium under the Hahn conditions. 7 Gaudet and Salant (1991) describe the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, which may not be interior, in a similar but slightly different way.
There can be more than one way to model how i x is adjusted as a continuous function of time t. The following two dynamics are the most representative in the literature.
Assumption 3: i x as a non-negative function of continuous time t is adjusted according
where a positive number i  denotes speed of adjustment.
Assumption 4: i x as a non-negative function of continuous time t is adjusted according
where a positive number i  denotes speed of adjustment.
First consider the gradient dynamics in Assumption 3, which is assumed by Dixit (1986), Furth (1986) , Dastidar (2000) among others. Define
For the sake of notational simplicity, define 
 
  V x may not be differentiable with respect to t.
11
Following Hale (1969, p.293) , define
Since
, the arguments similar to the ones in the Appendix lead to
and the set   K t in (4) is empty,   V x is differentiable with respect to t and its time derivative can be calculated as 
Consider the case of
If there is no 0
. By (7') and (8'), the following two inequalities must hold.
 
Since the sets I and J are not empty for any *  x x such that * X X  , as in (7'), the right hand side of (9) is negative. Similarly, the right hand side of (10) 
Conclusion
As Folmer and von Mouche (2004) proved, if an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. However, their theorem does not ensure that the unique Nash equilibrium is interior. We have therefore formulated dynamics at the point where the trajectory moves out of the non-negative domain and proved that if an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, the unique Nash equilibrium is globally stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints. This implies the global stability result of Hahn (1962) , Okuguchi (1964) and Corchón (2001) under the original or generalized Hahn conditions, whose proofs contain a defect as pointed out by Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1985) .
